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Abstract—It is known that many Twitter users are bots,
which are accounts controlled and sometimes created by
computers. Twitter bots can send spam tweets, manipulate
public opinion and be used for online fraud. Here we report
the discovery, retrieval, and analysis of the ‘Star Wars’ botnet
in Twitter, which consists of more than 350,000 bots tweeting
random quotations exclusively from Star Wars novels. The
botnet contains a single type of bot, showing exactly the
same properties throughout the botnet. It is unusually large,
many times larger than other available datasets. It provides
a valuable source of ground truth for research on Twitter
bots. We analysed and revealed rich details on how the botnet
was designed and created. As of this writing, the Star Wars
bots are still alive in Twitter. They have survived since their
creation in 2013, despite the increasing efforts in recent years
to detect and remove Twitter bots. We also reflect on the
‘unconventional’ way in which we discovered the Star Wars
bots, and discuss the current problems and future challenges
of Twitter bot detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
Twitter plays an increasingly important role in modern
society. There are more than 313 million active users,
and about 500 million tweets are created everyday [1].
Twitter has been the subject of intensive study in recent
years, including the graph structure of Twitter users [3]
and ways to measure the influence of a Twitter user [4]. A
popular research trend is to analyse the real-time stream of
tweets as data source to detect and predict events, such as
outbreak of epidemics [5], election results [6], earthquakes
and typhoons [7].
A. Twitter bots and botnet
There are a lot of fake Twitter user accounts, called
bots [8], that are used and controlled by computers and
algorithms, instead of real people. A botnet is a collection
of bots that have the same properties and are controlled
by the same ’botmaster’ [9].
B. Threats of Twitter bots
Some Twitter bots have benign purposes, for example
automated tweet alert of a new research article or weather
forecast. The subject of our research is the large number
of bots that have non-benign purposes, such as the follow-
ings.
a) Spamming: Spammer bots can send a large
amount of unsolicited content to other users. The most
common objective of spam is getting users to click on ad-
vertising links with questionable value [10], or propagate
computer viruses and other malware.
b) Fake trending topics: If bots are able to pass as
humans through Twitter’s filters, they would be counted
by Twitter for choosing trending topics and hashtags. This
would allow the bots to create fake trending topics that are
not actually being popular in Twitter.
c) Opinion manipulation: A large group of bots
can misrepresent public opinion [12]. If the bots are not
detected in time, they could tweet like real users, but
coordinated centrally around a specific topic. They could
all post positive or negative tweets skewing metrics used
by companies and researchers to track opinions on that
topics.
d) Astroturfing: Bots can orchestrate a campaign to
create a fake sense of agreement among Twitter users [11],
[13], where they mask the sponsor of the message, making
it seem like it originates from the community itself.
e) Fake Followers: Fake followers can be bought or
sold online [14]. After receiving payment from a user,
the botmaster of a botnet can instruct its bots to follow
that user. Fake followers could make a user seem more
important than it is [4], [15], [16]. One would expect that
fake followers should try to appear like real users [17],
[10], however people rarely verify whether someone’s
followers are human or bots.
f) Streaming API contamination: Many research
works rely on analysing tweet data returned by Twitter’s
streaming API. It is reported [19] that the API is suscepti-
ble to an attack by bots, where bots can time their tweets
in such a way that their tweets can be included in the API
with a probability higher than the expected 1%, up to as
high as 82%.
C. Twitter bots detection
It has been reported that Twitter has been identifying
and removing suspicious users, many of which are spam-
mer bots [20]. Twitter does not disclose their bot data. One
may wonder whether Twitter removes as many bots as it
possibly can.
Researchers have proposed a series of methods to detect
Twitter bots [21], [22], [20]. For example, [23] used
the Levensthein distance between tweets of each user to
identify bots; [24] and [25] aimed to classify bots quickly
with minimum information; [11] discovered a botnet of
130 bots.
It is recognised that a major challenge to the research
on Twitter bots is a lack of ground truth data [21]. So
far, datasets that have been made publicly available by
researchers are small, with the largest dataset contains
only a few thousands of bots. All these datasets contain
many types of bots from different botnets. Many identified
bots have been suspended and therefore disappeared from
Twitter.
D. Contributions of this paper
Here, we report the discovery of the ’Star Wars’ botnet
in Twitter. This dataset is unique and valuable for a
number of reasons. First, it is unusually large, containing
more than 350,000 bots; second, it is the first dataset that
only contains one type of bots from a single botnet and
therefore showing the same properties; third, the identified
bots, at the time of this publication, are still alive in
Twitter, allowing researchers to collect, monitor and study
them; and finally, the Star Wars bots exhibit some inter-
esting properties that have not been reported before. New
knowledge learned from this botnet has already allowed us
to discover another botnet with more than half a million
bots, which will be reported in a separate paper.
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II. DISCOVERY OF THE STAR WARS BOTS
The Star Wars bots were discovered by chance when
we studied the location of tweets created by a 1% random
sample of Twitter users.
A. Data of 1% random Twitter users
There have been efforts to collect complete datasets
from Twitter [26], [27]. Most studies, however, have relied
on sampled datasets [28], [29]. We can use Twitter stream
API to get samples of real-time tweets [30]. Or we can
obtain a sample of Twitter users and then use Twitter API
to retrieve the latest 3,200 tweets of each of the users.
Twitter users can be sampled in various ways, such as
random walk and breadth-first search [18], [28] on the
Twitter user graph.
Twitter users can also be collected by random uniform
sampling [31], [32]. While each user chooses its own
username, Twitter assigns each user a unique 32-bit ID
number1. In early 2015, we randomly chose user IDs with
a uniform 1% probability in the ID space ranging from 1 to
232. We retrieved the user profile for each valid user ID. In
this work, we considered only English-speaking users, so
we filtered out any user whose declared interface language
was not English.
We collected 6 million random (English speaking) Twit-
ter users, which are called the 1% random users dataset.
B. Abnormal distribution of tweet locations
Different from the registered location in its profile, a
Twitter user can choose to tag each tweet with the latitude
and longitude coordinates where the tweet is created.
Change of tweet locations reflects a user’s mobility.
The 1% random users had 843 million tweets, of which
20 million had a location tag. Figure 1 shows the number
of tweets located in each geographic cell of 1o longitude
width and 1o latitude height. While the distribution of
tweet locations is in general coincident with the distri-
bution of Twitter users population, there is an anomaly in
the form of two rectangular areas over North America and
Europe that are solidly filled with blue colour cells (with
1 - 9 tweets) over large uninhabited areas such as seas,
deserts and frozen lands. Outside the two rectangles, there
are only a few blue colour cells on such uninhabited areas.
The two rectangles have sharp corners and straight
borders that are parallel to the latitude and longitude lines.
These are distinct characteristics of computer automation.
Our instinct was that these uniform, low-density blan-
kets of tweets over uninhabited area were likely created
by Twitter bots. Computer programs can easily tag tweets
with randomly generated latitude and longitude values in
the ranges covering the borders of North America and
Europe/North Africa. A possible explanation is that the
bots might try to pretend that they tweet from North
America and Europe where Twitter is popular.
C. Tweets of random quotations from Star Wars novels
There are 23,820 tweets located in the blue-colour cells
inside the two rectangles. We manually checked the text of
these tweets. We found out that many of these tweets were
1Twitter has extended the user ID space to 64 bits, which has no effect
on this work.
Classifier results Star Wars Bots Real Users Total
Correct 2996 8987 11983
Incorrect 4 13 17
Accuracy 99.8% 99.8% 99.8%
Table I: The Confusion Matrix
randomly quoted from Star Wars novels. It is known that
Twitter bots often quote from books or online sources [17].
We identified that at least 11 different Star Wars novels
are used as the source of the tweets. Here is an example
tweet:
Luke’s answer was to put on an extra burst
of speed. There were only ten meters #separating
them now. If he could cover t
This tweet is quoted from the book Star Wars: Choices of
One, where Luke Skywalker is a distinct character. Some
tweets started or ended with a truncated word. Some tweets
have a hashtag or a hash symbol inserted at a random
place. Figure 2 shows how a Star Wars bot looks in the
Twitter homepage.
D. Definition of Star Wars bots
The tweets in the blue-colour cells are created by 3,244
Twitter users. Upon further examination, we found that
these suspicious users also show all of the following
properties.
• They only tweet random quotations from the Star
Wars novels. Each tweet contains one quotation, often
with incomplete sentences or broken words at the
beginning or at the end.
• The only extra text that is sometimes inserted in such
a tweet is either (1) one of the special hashtags asso-
ciated with attracting followers, such as #teamfollow-
back and #followme; or (2) the hash symbol # inserted
in front of a randomly chosen word (including the
stop words, like "the" and "in") to form a hashtag.
• They have created no more than 11 tweets in their
lifetime. They never retweet; and they never mention
any other Twitter user.
• They have no more than 10 followers, and no more
than 31 friends.
• They only choose ‘Twitter for Windows Phone’ as
the source of their tweets.
• Their Twitter user IDs are densely concentrated
within a narrow space between 1.5× 109 and 1.6×
109. See Figure 3.
These distinct, unusual properties convinced us that we
have discovered a new type of Twitter bots, the Star Wars
bots, which are defined as Twitter users that exhibit all
properties in the above list.
III. RETRIEVAL OF THE STAR WARS BOTNET
In the above section we discovered the Star Wars bots
manually from the 1% random users. In this section we
will use an automatic classifier to retrieve all Star Wars
bots that form the whole Star Wars botnet based solely on
textual features of tweets created by a user.
To contrast against the Star Wars bots, we collect a
dataset of 9,000 random real users. Starting from a known
real user, we collected the friends that it follows, and then
(a) World
(b) North America (c) Europe
Figure 1: Distribution of geographic locations of tweets created by 1% random Twitter users. The map is divided into
cells of 1 latitude and 1 longitude. The number of tweets in each cell is coded with colours.
Figure 2: A Star Wars bot as it appears on Twitter
collected the friends of its friends. We collected four levels
of friends using breadth-first search. We got two million
users. We randomly selected 9k English-speaking users.
These users are mostly real users, because a real user’s
friends are usually also real users.
We collected all tweets of 3,000 of the Star Wars bots
that are manually tagged in the above section, and all
tweets of the 9,000 real users. We remove stop words and
non alphabetical characters from the tweets except the #
symbol.
We obtained 30,000 words that were most frequently
tweeted by the bots, and 50,000 by the real users. Based
on these words, we created a word count vector for each
bot and real user.
We used this training dataset to train a Naive Bayes
classifier. We tested the classifier with 10-fold cross vali-
dation. The classifier achieved >99% for precision, recall
and F-measure on each of the folds. The confusion matrix
is shown in table I.
As a sanity test, we also created a balanced training
dataset of 9k real users and 9k bots (by adding two copies
of the bots). Training with this dataset produced near
identical results.
It is evident that this basic machine learning classifier is
sufficient for this task. This is because tweets created by
the Star Wars bots show textual features that are distinct
from those created by real users, as illustrated in Figure
4.
Properties Random users Star Wars bots
Number of users 6,063,970 356,957
Users with location-tagged tweets 208,612 349,045
% users with location-tagged tweets 3.4% 97.7%
Number of tweets 842,670,281 2,422,013
Location-tagged tweets 19,777,003 1,209,597
% of location-tagged tweets 2.3% 49.9%
Of the location-tagged tweets
Tweets in EU rectangle 3,486,239 604,647
% of tweets in EU rectangle 17.6% 50.0%
Tweets in N. Am. rectangle 8,950,941 604,912
% of tweets in N. Am. rectangle 45.2% 50.0%
Tweets elsewhere 7,339,823 38
% of tweets elsewhere 37.1% 0.0%
Tweet source
Twitter for iPhone 31.1% -
Twitter Web client 17.2% -
Twitter for Android 14.9% -
Twitter for Blackberry 6.8% -
Mobile Web 0.99% -
Twitter for Windows Phone 0.02% 100%
Table II: Properties of the Star Wars bots and the 1% random users.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3: Distribution of Twitter user IDs. (a) Percentage
of user IDs that are in use in each bin of 1 million IDs.
(b) Distribution of user IDs of the Star Wars bots (in red
colour), where the y axis is shown in log scale.
According to the definition of Star Wars bots, we
collected the 14 million English-speaking Twitter users
whose IDs were between 1.5 × 109 and 1.6 × 109. We
removed users with > 11 tweets, > 10 followers or > 31
friends. We also removed users whose tweet source is not
’Twitter for Windows Phone’. From the remaining users,
the classifier retrieved 356,957 Star Wars bots.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STAR WARS BOTNET
Table II shows properties of the 356,957 Star Wars bots
in comparison to the 1% random users.
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Word cloud representations of the most fre-
quently tweeted words by (a) Star Wars bots and (b) real
users. The font size of a word indicates the frequency of
the word’s appearance in tweets. The frequency number
of some selected words are shown.
A. Tweet location properties
The Star Wars bots are retrieved by the classifier based
solely on tweet text features without tweet location infor-
mation. As shown in Table II, very few random users have
location-tagged tweets. In contrast, 97.7% of the Star Wars
bots have at least one location-tagged tweet; and almost
exactly half of all tweets created by the bots have location
tags.
The 1.2 million location-tagged tweets of the Star Wars
bots are distributed inside the two rectangles with an
exact 50/50 split, except only 38 tweets falling outside
Figure 5: Geographic distribution of 1.2 million location-
tagged tweets created by the Star Wars bots.
the rectangles.
As expected, Figure 5 shows that the 1.2 million
tweets are uniformly distributed in the two rectangles. The
uniform distribution is also confirmed by examining the
number of tweets in each cell as shown in Figure 6. These
unusual properties strongly indicate an artificial control by
computer programmes.
We also calculated the average Haversine distance2
between two consecutive location-tagged tweets of a user.
Figure 7 shows that the distribution of this quantity for
the random users follows a power-law, with an average
distance of less than 40 km. In sharp contrast, the dis-
tribution for the Star Wars bots resembles a bell curve,
with an average distance of 2,064km, which is about the
distance between centres of the two rectangles.
This suggests that when a Star Wars bot fakes its tweet
locations, it firstly randomly chooses a continent, either
Europe or North America, with equal probability; and
then randomly generates a pair of latitude and longitude
values within the ranges of that region. As such, many
consecutive tweets are located in different continents.
B. Connectivity properties
After collecting all friends and followers of the Star
Wars bots, we noticed the tell-tale signs of bot activity, i.e.
the bots disproportionately follow other bots in the same
botnet. When a user A follows a user B, we define A as
a follower of B; and B as a friend of A. Such following
relationship can be represented as a directed link A–>B,
which is an incoming link of B or an outgoing link of A.
The Star Wars bots have in total 733,000 followers and
1,817,000 friends.
As illustrated in Figure 8, 91% of the bots’ incoming
links come from the botnet itself; in other words, most of
the bots’ followers are other Star Wars bots.
Of the 1.8 million outgoing links, 1/3 follow other Star
Wars bots and 2/3 follow users outside of the botnet.
Additionally, Star Wars bots follow a few users dispro-
portionately, this means many bots follow the same users
outside of the botnet. Table III shows some examples of
users heavily followed by the botnet, but which are not
part of it.
2Defined as the surface distance between two locations taking into
account of the Earth’s near-sphere shape [33].
V. DISCUSSION
A. Creation of the Star Wars botnet
The above analysis reveals many details on the design
and creation of the Star Wars bots.
Firstly, the user IDs of the Star Wars bots are between
1.5× 109 and 1.6× 109. From this we can infer that the
Star Wars botnet was created between 20 June - 14 July
2013, because that was the time period Twitter assigned
user IDs from that range to new users, we naturally double
checked against the actual date from the API and found
this to be true.
Secondly, each Star Wars bot only created a few tweets,
all of which were random quotations from one of a series
of Star Wars novels. Some tweets have random hashtags
inserted.
Thirdly, half of the tweets were tagged with a faked
location, which was a random location within one of the
two rectangles.
Fourthly, the bots only claimed Windows phone as tweet
source. And they did not retweet or mention other users.
B. Reflection on the discovery
We discovered the Star Wars bots by accident. The
bots tagged their tweets with random locations in North
America and Europe as a deliberated effort to make their
tweets look more real. But this trick backfired – the
fake locations when plotted on a map were completely
abnormal. It’s important to note that this anomaly could
only be noticed by a human looking at the map. A
computer algorithm would have a hard time to realise
the anomaly, especially when the anomaly only associates
with areas with low density distribution of tweets.
It was also a ‘mistake’ for the bots to use the Star Wars
novels as the sole source of their tweets. So when we
studied the abnormal tweets, the Star Wars theme was easy
to see. It was also this feature that allowed us to use a
simple classifier to accurately identify all Star War bots.
In addition, the fact that all of the bots were created
during a relatively small period of time (and thus were
given user IDs within a narrow range), gave us the
additional convenience to test only users registered in that
period.
C. ‘Success’ of the Star Wars botnet
There have been a lot of efforts to detect and remove
bots from Twitter. How can such a huge botnet, created in
2013, remain hidden until now?
Firstly it seems the Star Wars bots were deliberately
designed to keep a low profile. They tweeted a few times,
not too many, not too few. They avoided doing anything
special.
Secondly they only tweeted random quotations from
novels. This helped the tweets appear like using real
human’s language. This invalidates many bot detection
methods based on detecting language created by machines.
Thirdly the bots were carefully designed to have ‘nor-
mal’ user profiles. We observed that some of the bots
even have profile pictures. This invalidates the detection
methods based on profile analysis.
Finally and more importantly, it seems the Star Wars
bots were deliberately designed to circumvent many of the
Figure 6: Number of tweets created by the Star Wars bots and the random users in geographic cells inside the two
rectangles. The cells in each rectangle are ordered with increasing number of tweets created by the random users.
Figure 7: Distribution of the Star Wars bots and the
random users as a function of the average Haversine dis-
tance between consecutive location-tagged tweets. The two
vertical dash lines show the average Haversine distance for
all the bots and all the random users, respectively.
Figure 8: Star Wars botnet’s incoming links come mostly
from the botnet itself
Figure 9: Distributions of in-degree (followers) and out-
degree (friends or followees) for the Star Wars bots and
the random users. The insets show the same distributions
in linear scale.
heuristics underlying bot detection methods. For example,
contrary to popular assumptions on bots, the Star Wars
bots do not have any URLs in their tweets, they never
mention or reply to other users, and they only follow a
small number of friends in comparison to random users
(see Figure 9).
D. Critical reflection on Twitter bot detection
It is likely that botmasters are keeping their eyes on
the latest developments on bot detection techniques. For
example, after reading this paper, bot designers may learn
a lesson that there is no need to tag tweets with locations
at all, because most users do not. Also, quotations should
use diverse sources, such as a random collection of novels,
magazines or social media postings.
Future botnets could easily be programmed to avoid
such design ‘mistakes’. Indeed, future bots can learn
lessons from all previous detection methods, and it may
become more and more difficult to detect future botnets.
So far there is no known feature that can be used to
distinguish bots from real users that cannot be deliberately
modified by bots.
Given the challenge ahead, it is time to reflect on some
of the problems in the bot detection research area. For
example, many detection methods are based on assump-
tions about bots, but many of such assumptions are not
sufficiently supported by data evidence.
Secondly, recent efforts on Twitter bot detections are
increasingly focused on exploring machine learning tech-
niques, where bot detection becomes merely an ‘appli-
cation’ of the techniques. There are much fewer efforts
in collecting ground truth data and analysing real bot
behaviours. In this work we used one of the most basic
machine learning classifiers, however we uncovered a
botnet far larger than most of previous research efforts.
Finally, some researchers are keen to seek for a ‘general’
method that is able to detect all bots, but they fail to
explain why vastly different types of bots or botnets should
share any common features at all. Indeed, existing works
aiming for a general detection method have only detected
a small number of bots. Such a ‘general’ approach will
become more problematic as future new bots will be
designed to be different from any bots that have been
detected and reported.
E. Potential threats of dormant Twitter bots
The low tweet count and the long period of inactivity
of the Star Wars bots might look like a reason to think
they are harmless. The years-long inactivity may make
one wonder whether the bots have been forgotten by their
master, or the access credentials were lost, or the bots
were created only for fun? However, it takes effort and
resources to create such a large number of bots and it is
unlikely they have been forgotten, especially when they
are actually very useful and valuable.
What if the master of the botnet deliberately make them
dormant with a low profile? If so, not only the bots have
successfully defeated previous detection efforts, but also
they can in theory pose all of the threats discussed in
Section I-B, including spam, fake trending topics, opinion
manipulation, and astroturfing. Threats could be enacted
whenever the botmaster chooses to re-activate the botnet.
It is known [22] that pre-aged bots are sold at a premium
on the black market. This means the Star Wars bots are
perfectly suited to be sold as fake followers because they
are already four years old and therefore more ’valuable’.
Furthermore, they have a few tweets and a few connections
Twitter user ID Number of Star Wars bot followers
19196415 15,955
14230524 14,315
39922782 13,018
29547045 11,946
Table III: Examples of large numbers of Star Wars bots
following the same Twitter users outside of the Star Wars
botnet
each, making them seem more human than an "egg"
account created the day before it is sold.
For example, as shown in Table III, we found that there
are a few users (who are not members of the Star Wars
botnet) are followed by large numbers of the Star Wars
bots. It is likely these bots have already been sold as fake
followers to those users.
In recent years, fake online user accounts, including
Twitter bots, have been increasingly used for online ad-
vertisement fraud with billions of dollars on stake [2],
where computers log into fake accounts and then browser
webpages to generate fake impressions and clicks. In this
case, even if the bots are being used daily, we will not see
any tweeting activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The discovery of the Star Wars botnet provides a valu-
able source of ground truth data for research on Twitter
bots. It is very large, many times larger than publicly
available datasets. More importantly, it contains only a
single botnet – and the whole of the botnet, which allows
us to reveal the details on how the botnet was designed
and created. As of this writing, the Star Wars bots are
still alive on Twitter, which provides researchers a rare
opportunity to monitor and study the bots. The more we
know and understand the design and behaviour of bots, the
more likely we will be able to propose effective methods
to uncover and fight against them.
The data of the Star Wars bots are available for re-
searchers on request. Researchers can also collected the
bots by following details in this paper. Recently we
discovered a special property of the Star Wars bots that has
never been reported before. Based on this knowledge, we
discovered another every larger Twitter botnet with more
than 500k bots. This will be reported in a separate paper.
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